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According to socioemotional selectivity theory (SST), old age is associated with a greater 
emphasis on self-regulation of emotional states, a focus that fosters a bias in processing 
positively valenced material in older adults.  There is disagreement, however, about whether 
the “positivity bias” suggested by SST influences performance on memory tasks. Some 
studies suggest that older adults remember more positive than negative information, or 
simply less negative information, relative to younger adults, whereas other studies report no 
such differences. This thesis examined (1) whether variations across studies in encoding 
instructions or in personal relevance of study materials could account for these 
inconsistencies, and (2) whether differences in attention at encoding to positive, negative, 
and neutral stimuli could account for the positivity bias in older adults’ later memory for the 
stimuli. In Experiment 1, younger and older adults were instructed either to passively view 
positive, negative, and neutral pictures or to actively categorize them by valence. On a 
subsequent incidental recall test, older adults recalled equal numbers of positive and negative 
pictures, whereas younger adults recalled negative pictures best. There was no effect of 
encoding instructions. Crucially, when pictures were grouped into high and low personal 
relevance according to participants’ ratings, a positivity bias emerged only for low relevance 
pictures. In Experiment 2, attention to pictures at encoding was directly manipulated through 
use of a divided attention paradigm. Although divided attention lowered recall in both age 
groups, attention did not interact with age and valence. Taken together, the results suggest 
that variability in the personal relevance of study pictures may be the factor underlying cross-
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Older adults experience declines in many aspects of health, including decrements in 
perceptual and cognitive functions. Moreover, old age had traditionally been considered a 
time of suboptimal emotional functioning (see Carstensen, 1995). The awareness that death is 
not far off purportedly brought about increased introspection, withdrawal from social 
activities, and the dampening of emotional experiences (Cumming & Henry, 1961). The view 
that older adults are less concerned about their emotional experiences compared to younger 
adults has been vigorously challenged, however, and current research indicates that older 
adults place more emphasis on optimizing emotional functioning than do younger adults! 
Currently under debate is how this greater focus on emotional functioning affects older 
adults' cognitive processing. This thesis examines age-related changes in cognitive 
processing of emotional material, and in particular, how memory for emotional material 
differs in younger and older adults, to shed light on the contentious issue of whether older 
adults have better memory for positive information, relative to negative and neutral 
information. 
The introduction will begin with a short discussion of the characteristics of emotions. 
Next, changes in emotional experiences during aging and the impact of these changes on 
cognitive functioning will be discussed, followed by a statement of the goals of the thesis. 
1.1 Introduction to Emotion 
   Emotions have been conceptualized in psychology as possessing two separate 
dimensions: valence and arousal. Valence refers to the pleasantness (positive/negative) of a 
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stimulus or episode, whereas arousal refers to its intensity (high intensity/low intensity) 
(Barrett & Wager, 2006), also conceptualized as the level of excitement that it generates 
(calming/exciting) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). For example, seeing a picture of a 
loved one may produce feelings with a positive valence and low arousal, whereas seeing a 
picture of an execution may produce feelings with a negative valence and high arousal. 
Neutral stimuli have been conceptualized as the absence of valence, or a valence in between 
positive and negative (LaBar & Cabeza, 2006). 
Recent explanations suggest that emotions arise from subjective cognitive appraisals 
of the valence and arousal of events (Scherer, Dan, & Flykt, 2006), speaking to the 
fundamental link between emotions and cognitive processes (Lazarus, 1991). In the human 
brain, structures such as the anterior cingulate cortex, insula, hippocampus, and amygdala are 
known to play a role in the processing of emotional information (Davidson, Fox, & Kalin, 
2007).  
1.2 Emotion and Aging 
Despite declines in many aspects of health and of perceptual and cognitive functions, 
there is increasing evidence that older adults are happier than younger adults. For instance, 
cross-sectional studies have shown that older adults experience fewer negative feelings and 
emotions (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Gross et al., 1997; Mroczek & 
Kolarz, 1998), and longitudinal studies have shown that negative affect generally decreases 
with increasing age (Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001). Older adults dissipate negative 
affect, and maintain positive affect, better than younger adults (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, 
& Nesselroade, 2000), and also report greater control of their emotions (Gross et al., 1997; 
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Lawton, Kleban, Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992). 
This pattern fits well with an influential recent theory - socioemotional selectivity 
theory (SST; Carstensen, 1995). Carstensen postulates that as people age and perceive their 
remaining life to be more limited, their goals shift from seeking new information, to ensuring 
emotion regulation. Emotion regulation, as defined by Carstensen, is the maintenance of a 
positive affective state, and engaging in emotionally meaningful activities and relationships 
(Carstensen, 1995). Carstensen implies that this is an active process such that older adults 
and people who view their time left in life as limited will actively seek out emotionally 
fulfilling, positive, experiences (e.g., interacting with emotionally close over novel partners). 
Consistent with this, recent research indicates that older adults engage in cognitive control to 
prevent negative information from impacting their cognition (e.g., Mather & Knight, 2005). 
This definition of emotion regulation differs from Gross’ classic conceptualization of 
emotion regulation (see Gross & Thompson, 2007), which can result from processes that are 
“automatic or controlled, conscious or unconscious” (Gross & Thompson, 2007, p. 8). Also, 
Carstensen’s conceptualization of emotion regulation centres on increasing positive affect or 
decreasing negative affect, whereas emotion regulation as defined by Gross does not serve 
such a specific purpose. For instance, according to Gross’ definition an individual may 
engage in emotion regulation to increase negative affect by choosing to listen to sad songs 
when in a sad mood. 
It is also important to keep in mind that both emotion regulation and information 
seeking are purported to be present throughout the lifespan. Rather, it is the salience of each 
of the goals that changes throughout life. In young adults the information seeking goal is said 
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to be most salient, and emotion regulation goals would be less salient. For older adults, on 
the other hand, emotion regulation goals are more salient than information seeking goals. 
SST posits that perception of time is the primary factor that motivates people to switch from 
the goal of novel information seeking to the goal of emotion regulation. People who imagine 
their time left in life to be expansive, such as younger adults, will preferentially focus on 
acquiring new information and having novel experiences; people who view their time as 
being limited, such as older adults (and also younger adults with a terminal disease), prefer to 
maximize the maintenance of positive emotions and to engage in emotionally meaningful 
experiences. This focus on emotion regulation has been demonstrated in older adults’ 
preference for interacting with emotionally close over novel partners (Fredrickson & 
Carstensen, 1990; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). 
Thus, according to SST, it is the perception of limited time that is associated with 
aging, rather than the aging process per se, which accounts for the shift toward an emphasis 
on maintaining positive emotions. For example, when forced to choose between 
advertisements which emphasize either emotionally meaningful or knowledge-seeking goals, 
older adults prefer those that are emotionally meaningful, in contrast to younger adults who 
prefer advertisements that emphasize knowledge-seeking goals (Fung & Carstensen, 2003). 
In support of this account, when older adults make this choice after imagining a scenario in 
which their lives would be appreciably extended, they demonstrate a preference for the 
advertisements that emphasize knowledge-seeking to the same extent as do younger adults.  
This focus on emotion regulation can also be experimentally induced by asking 
participants to focus on their current emotional state. For instance, Kennedy, Mather, and 
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Carstensen (2004) asked both older and middle-aged nuns to recall information about their 
level of well-being from the previous 14 years, while focusing on (a) their current emotional 
state, (b) the accuracy of their memories, or (c) without being given any instructions 
(control). Older control participants and participants that focused on current emotional state 
recalled their past as being more positive than they had reported 14 years before, whereas 
younger controls and older participants who focused on memory accuracy, recalled their past 
as being more negative than previously reported. Thus, the study also demonstrates how a 
focus on current emotional state can affect the characteristics of autobiographical memories. 
The idea that a focus on emotion regulation can affect cognitive processing has been 
explored more fully in a number of other studies. 
1.3 Emotion, Aging, and Cognition 
Recent work has sought to determine whether this shift in goal from information 
seeking to emotion regulation influences age-related changes in cognitive processing. 
Because older adults are purported to be more focused on emotion regulation (the 
maintenance of positive affect), it is hypothesized that, relative to younger adults, they also 
cognitively process positive stimuli to a greater extent than negative stimuli (see Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005). This phenomenon has been referred to as a “positivity bias” in older 
adults (or those nearing the end of life). It is important to note that the positivity bias can also 
be characterized as a decrease in cognitive processing for negative stimuli relative to younger 
adults, as at least one study has demonstrated this pattern of results (Charles et al., 2003, 
Experiment 2). This distinction highlights the importance of including a reasonable baseline 
(i.e. neutral stimuli) against which to measure changes. It is also important to note that the 
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positivity bias is typically conceptualized as a within-groups difference, such that the pattern 
of the effect of valence is different in each age group. For instance, it could be shown that 
older adults have a better memory for positive items relative to negative items, whereas 
younger adults have equal memory for both positive and negative items. Or, it could be 
shown that older adults have equal memory for positive and negative items, whereas younger 
adults have a better memory for negative items. In the latter case, it can be said that younger 
adults display a negativity bias in memory, whereas older adults do not display a negativity 
bias. 
To this end, a number of studies have examined the extent to which older adults’ 
attention is directed to positive relative to negative or neutral stimuli. It has been 
demonstrated that older adults avoid negative information and prefer to focus their attention 
on positive stimuli. For example, in a dot-probe paradigm, older and younger participants 
were shown pairs of faces, one with a positive or negative facial expression and the other 
with a neutral expression (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). When the face pair disappeared, a 
dot was shown in the location of one of the faces.  Participants were instructed to indicate the 
location of the dot. Older adults were slower to respond when the dot appeared in the 
location of the negative face, and faster when it appeared in the location of a positive face, 
relative to when the dot appeared in the location of a neutral face. Younger adults did not 
show a response speed bias for either emotional face. Another study used eye tracking to 
monitor the gaze patterns of older and younger adults while they viewed pairs of faces, one 
of which was neutral and the other of which expressed one of several negative emotions, or 
happiness (Issacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006). Older adults’ gaze patterns were 
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directed toward happy faces and away from (negative) angry faces, whereas younger adults’ 
gaze patterns were directed toward (negative) fear faces.  In another eye tracking study, 
participants viewed pairs of pictures, one of which was neutral and the other of which was 
either negative or positive (Rösler et al., 2005). Although there were no age differences in 
attention to positive pictures, compared to older adults, younger adults spent more time 
looking at the negative image of the pair.  
In addition to these studies, others in the area of decision-making have shown that, 
relative to younger adults, older adults spend more time examining the positive options of an 
item, and less time examining negative options of the item (Mather, Knight, McCaffrey, 
2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging provides evidence of a neural basis for these 
age differences in processing of emotional material.  For example, although both younger 
and older adults show greater activation in regions associated with emotional processing, 
such as the amygdala, in response to viewing emotional relative to neutral pictures, older 
adults show relatively more brain activity in response to positive than to negative pictures 
(Mather et al., 2004). These studies suggest that emotional content influences cognitive 
functioning, particularly in older adults. 
Whereas studies of attention have supported the possibility of a positivity bias in 
older adults, evidence for a bias in memory for positive information is more variable and 
appears to depend on the type of memory test and the nature of the stimuli used.  Aging is a 
variable certainly known to influence memory, and generally memory decreases with 
advancing age (see Nilsson, 2003, for a review).  Interestingly, emotion can change the 
pattern of memory deficits in older adults. Studies have shown that emotion (both positive 
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and negative) can “boost” memorability of items in younger (Cahill & McGaugh, 1995) and 
older (Denburg, Buchanan, Tranel, & Adolphs, 2003) adults. For example, in a study by 
Charles, Mather, and Carstensen (2003, Experiment 1) older and younger adults were shown 
positive, negative, and neutral images.  On a later memory recall test, older adults recalled a 
greater number of positive compared to negative and neutral images, whereas younger adults 
showed better memory for both positive and negative relative to neutral images. Thus relative 
to younger adults, who show a similar emotionality boost in memory for both positive and 
negative stimuli, older adults displayed the boost more for positive stimuli. 
 Similar findings have been documented on tests of working memory for images 
(Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & Carstensen, 2005), and memory for choices (Mather & 
Johnson, 2000). In studies of autobiographical memory, older adults typically show a 
positivity bias (e.g., Field, 1981; Kennedy et al., 2004; Levine & Bluck, 1997). Particularly 
telling is a study in which participants recalled positive, negative, and neutral 
autobiographical memories and then rated each memory on a number of characteristics 
(Comblain, D’Argembeau, & Van der Linden, 2005). Interestingly, older adults rated their 
negative memories as eliciting more positive emotion compared to younger adults, 
suggesting that older adults re-evaluate their negative memories to highlight any positive 
aspects. 
Other work, however, fails to show such a positivity bias in memory in older adults.  
Studies of episodic memory for words have not supported a positivity bias in older relative to 
younger adults. In studies in which participants were given incidental (Leigland, Schulz, & 
Janowsky, 2004) or intentional (Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005) memory tests for positive, 
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negative, and neutral words, both older and younger adults recalled a greater proportion of 
positive relative to negative and neutral words, and displayed a bias in recognition for both 
types of emotional words relative to neutral words (Leigland et al., 2004). No age group X 
valence interaction emerged to indicate a positivity bias in older adults. To account for these 
results, it has been suggested that “age differences in the positive-negative disparity of 
emotional memory are more likely [to be observed] under conditions in which the to-be-
remembered material elicits strong emotional reactions. In such conditions, age differences in 
emotional reactivity and in the ability to self-regulate emotion could play important roles” 
(Grühn et al., 2005, p. 586). In essence, Grühn et al. (2005) suggest that words may not 
evoke emotional reactions that are strong enough to activate older adults’ emotion regulation 
goals, whereas stimuli such as photographs of emotional scenes do evoke emotional reactions 
strong enough to motivate older adults to engage in emotion regulation. 
Memory for emotional faces has also yielded mixed results. In one study, older adults 
recognized a smaller proportion of negative faces than did younger adults (Leigland et al., 
2004). Another study found no age differences in recognition memory for emotional faces: 
Both younger and older adults recognized more neutral faces that had previously been 
presented as happy (positive) than neutral faces that had been presented as angry (negative) 
(D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). 
Memory for emotional pictures (scenes) has also been mixed, with some studies 
showing the effect and others not. Support for a positivity bias in recall of emotional pictures 
for older adults was found by Charles et al. (2003, Experiment 1). Here, participants 
passively viewed positive, negative, and neutral pictures and then were given an incidental 
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recall test for the pictures after a 15 min delay. Whereas younger adults recalled equal 
numbers of positive and negative pictures, older adults recalled positive pictures best. Both 
age groups recalled greater numbers of both positive and negative pictures than neutral 
pictures. Evidence for a positivity bias in older adults’ recall was also found in a study by 
Mather and Knight (2005), in which participants also passively viewed study pictures. 
However, a number of studies have failed to find a positivity bias in older adults' recall for 
emotional pictures. In one study, older and younger adults were shown positive, negative, 
and neutral pictures and were asked to rate them during encoding according to emotional 
characteristics.  In an incidental recognition test for the pictures two weeks later, the authors 
failed to find a positivity bias for older adult participants (Comblain, D’Argembeau, Van der 
Linden, & Aldenhoff, 2004). Similarly, in another study that assessed memory for positive, 
negative, and neutral pictures in an incidental recall test 24 hrs after a study period in which 
participants closely attend to the emotion portrayed in each picture, both older and younger 
adults recalled a greater number of negative pictures, fewer positive pictures, and the fewest 
number of neutral pictures (Denburg et al., 2003). It is possible that the long delays between 
study and test may have affected the pattern of results of the studies above, however studies 
that used short delay periods have also failed to find evidence of a positivity bias in recall of 
emotional pictures for older adults (Kensinger, Brierly, Medford, Growdon, & Corkin, 2002; 
Charles et al., 2003, Experiment 2). This conflicting evidence regarding the existence of a 
positivity bias in older adults’ memory will be the focus of this thesis. 
1.4 Goals of the Current Thesis 
The goal of this thesis is to identify factors that influence older adults' memory for 
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emotional stimuli. More specifically, this thesis seeks to examine factors that determine 
whether older adults display a positivity bias in memory for realistic pictorial stimuli. In the 
first experiment, the influence of encoding instructions and personal relevance of study 
pictures on memory for positive, negative, and neutral pictures was examined. Because 
studies that instructed participants to simply view study pictures (a ‘passive’ encoding 
strategy) found a positivity bias in older adults’ memory (e.g., Charles et al. 2003), whereas 
studies that required participants to categorize or otherwise attend to the valence of study 
pictures (an ‘active’ encoding strategy) did not (e.g., Kensinger et al., 2002) the first 
experiment directly compared the two types of encoding instructions to determine whether 
this factor influences the positivity bias. Personal relevance of study pictures was also 
hypothesized to influence whether older adults display a positivity bias in memory, based on 
recent studies of memories high in self-relevance. The second experiment examined the 
effect of attention to pictures at study on later memory for the pictures, to determine whether 
a positivity bias in older adults’ memory may be due to greater attention paid to positive 
pictures at study. The motivations for examining each of the aforementioned factors in 
relation to a positivity bias in older adults’ memory will be fully explained in the introduction 




Experiment 1: Personal Relevance Modulates the Positivity Bias in 
Recall of Emotional Pictures in Older Adults (Tomaszczyk, 
Fernandes, & MacLeod, submitted)  
2.1 Introduction 
This experiment addresses possible reasons for the varying results of the effect of 
emotional valence on memory for pictures in older and younger adults. In Charles et al. 
(2003, Experiment 1), emotionality of pictures boosted later memory performance regardless 
of valence in young adults whereas the boost was restricted to positive stimuli in older adults 
(see also Mather & Knight, 2005).  However, in other studies in which older and younger 
adults actively rated positive, negative, and neutral pictures on emotional characteristics 
during encoding (Denburg et al., 2003; Kensinger et al.,  2002), no positivity bias was found.  
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine what could explain the discrepancy across 
studies in whether a positivity bias was observed in older adults. The first objective was to 
determine whether instructions during encoding influenced memory for positive, negative, 
and neutral pictures in younger and older adults. Studies that did find a positivity bias for 
older adults instructed participants to passively view pictures, whereas studies that failed to 
find a positivity bias instructed participants to actively rate pictures according to emotional 
characteristics. Consequently, instructions were manipulated between subjects by asking 
participants either (a) to passively view a series of pictures, or (b) to actively rate a series of 
pictures during encoding, prior to an incidental recall test for the pictures.  If instructional 
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differences are crucial, a positivity bias should emerge for older adults in the passive 
condition, as in the Charles et al. (2003) study, but there should be no positivity bias in older 
adults in an active condition, as in the Kensinger et al. (2003) study. Participants also 
completed a recognition test for the study pictures. A positivity bias was not expected to 
emerge in recognition performance, as previous work (e.g. Charles et al., 2003) has found 
evidence of a positivity bias only in older adults’ recall, but not in their recognition. 
It is also possible that the order in which pictures of different valences are recalled 
contributes to a positivity bias in older adults’ recall. If older adults output positive pictures 
before negative and neutral pictures, whereas younger adults output negative pictures before 
positive and neutral pictures, there could be a differential output interference effect (e.g., 
Smith, D’Agostino, & Reid, 1970) in younger compared to older adults.  That is, the rate and 
number of pictures recalled of a given emotionality may decrease with later output in both 
age groups. If older adults output positive valence items first, but younger adults do not, then 
younger adults will appear to have less of a positivity bias in recall.  To examine this 
possibility, the order in which positive, negative, and neutral pictures were recalled was 
analyzed. This was the first time that such an analysis had been undertaken. 
The second objective was to determine whether personal relevance of to-be-
remembered emotional stimuli influences memory. For this reason, a scale was constructed 
to measure personal relevance, based on the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) form from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 2001). Analyses were then 
conducted to test the possibility that the emergence of a positivity bias for older adults 
depends upon whether study pictures are high or low in personal relevance. Other work 
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suggests that age differences in memory for highly personally relevant emotional information 
are not always found. For example, flashbulb memories for the September 11th attack on their 
home country were preserved in both older and younger United States citizens (Davidson, 
Cook, & Glisky, 2006). Thus, memory for highly negative emotional information that is 
personally relevant may be preserved in older adults. 
At least one study has failed to find differences in the emotional characteristics of 
older and younger adults' (personal) autobiographical memories (Alea, Bluck, & Semegon, 
2004), suggesting that when material is highly relevant, older adults do not attend to positive 
information only.  Anecdotally, older adults do not seem to have difficulty recalling 
significant personal negative events, such as the death of a close friend, or a car accident 
involving family members, which suggests that they can commit highly personally relevant 
information to memory, even when that information is negative. If this is correct, then recall 
of pictures that are relatively high in personal relevance should not differ across positive and 
negative valence conditions, and there is no reason to expect that age would interact with 
emotional valence. Recall of pictures that are low in personal relevance, however, should 
differ across both valence and age groups, and differences in motivation suggested by SST 
should then result in a positivity bias in older adults. That is, when pictures are lower in 
personal relevance, older adults may be motivated more than younger adults to encode and 
maintain the positive rather than negative pictures in memory, in an effort to maintain a more 
positive affect, as suggested by SST. 
 
15 
2.2 Method and Results 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants.  One-hundred and twelve people took part in the study: Fifty-six healthy 
community-dwelling older adults (61-84 years of age; 35 female) were recruited through the 
University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 56 younger adults (18-23 
years of age; 38 female) were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes (see Table 1 
for participant characteristics).  For participating, older adults received $10 remuneration; 
younger adults received course credit. For both age groups, inclusion criteria were: fluency in 
English, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, no current or history of 
neuropsychological impairment, and no head injury resulting in unconsciousness for more 
than 1 minute.  For older adults, an additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 
on the Mini-Mental State Exam (MMSE, Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). The MMSE 
is a neuropsychological test that measures several aspects of cognition and provides an 
overall score of cognitive functioning. The MMSE is widely used to screen for preclinical 
dementia or cognitive impairment. The exclusion criterion based on MMSE score 
necessitated replacement of 2 older adults. The National Adult Reading Test – Revised 
(NART-R, Nelson, 1992) was used to compare the two age groups on level of intelligence. 
The NART-R provides a measure of full-scale IQ based upon the number of errors in 
pronunciation of low frequency English words. Older adults had a higher full scale IQ 
(FSIQ), F(1, 110) = 64.22, p < .001, as estimated by the NART - R, but did not differ from 














































































 Apparatus. Visual stimuli were presented on a Viewsonic VE710b LCD monitor 
(screen resolution set at 1280 x 1024 pixels), with E-prime software (Version 1.1; 
Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, USA), on a PC running Windows XP (Intel 
Pentium 4 CPU; 3GHz). 
Stimuli. Ninety-six digitized pictures were selected from the International Affective 
Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 2001), a collection of 800 pictures with normative ratings 
of valence and arousal based on a sample of young adults enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course. Normative ratings of IAPS pictures used a scale from 1 (most negative or 
least arousing) to 9 (most positive or most arousing). Of the 96 pictures selected, 32 were 
positive, 32 negative, and 32 neutral. Figure 1 shows a sample of each type of picture. Within 
each valence category, half of the pictures were of medium-low arousal and half were of 
medium-high arousal, and half in each valence and arousal combination contained people 
with the other half containing animals, nature scenes, or inanimate objects (see Appendix for 
picture list characteristics). 
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Figure 1. Samples of (a) positive, (b) negative, and (c) neutral IAPS pictures used in the 
study. 
(a)  (b)  (c)  
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 Across valence categories, average normative valence ratings differed (positive M = 
7.22, SD = 0.47; negative M = 2.87, SD = 0.41; neutral M = 5.24, SD = 0.53), using Tukey’s 
HSD (all ps < .001), and average normative arousal ratings did not differ (positive M = 4.90, 
SD = 0.86; negative M = 5.12, SD = 0.81; neutral M = 4.73, SD = 0.95; all ps > .10), all ps > 
.17. Medium-low (M = 4.12, SD = 0.33) and medium-high (M = 5.71, SD = 0.42) arousal 
pictures differed from each other with respect to average normative arousal rating, across 
valence categories (all ps < .001). 
The 96 pictures were divided into two lists of 48 pictures each, both preserving the 
characteristics of the original list. Pictures were matched for content between the lists (e.g., 
both lists contained pictures of dogs) as much as possible. Average normative valence ratings 
were matched between lists for positive pictures (list 1: M = 7.14, SD = 0.43, list 2: M = 
7.21, SD = 0.45), negative pictures (list 1: M = 2.90, SD = 0.38, list 2: M = 2.80, SD = 0.44), 
and neutral pictures (list 1: M = 5.20, SD = 0.50, list 2: M = 5.25, SD = 0.60). A two-way 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with list number and valence type as factors and normative 
valence ratings as the dependent variable revealed no main effect of list number (p = .93), 
and no interaction between list number and valence type (p = .76). Average normative 
arousal ratings were also matched between lists for positive pictures (list 1: M = 4.90, SD = 
0.90, list 2: M = 4.94, SD = 0.86), negative pictures (list 1: M = 5.00, SD = 0.86, list 2: M = 
5.17, SD = 0.81), and neutral pictures (list 1: M = 4.71, SD = 0.95, list 2: M = 4.84, SD = 
1.00). A two-way ANOVA with list number and valence type as factors and normative 
arousal ratings as the dependent variable revealed no main effect of list number (p = .54) and 
no interaction between list number and valence type (p = .96).  
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A list of six IAPS pictures was created for the practice phase, with two of medium 
arousal (one with and one without people) from each valence category.  All pictures were 
1010 x 752 pixels and covered almost the whole computer monitor; a black border filled the 
remainder. 
Procedure. There were two between subjects factors, age (younger, older) and 
instruction (passive, active), and one within-subject factor, valence (positive, negative, 
neutral). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions and were tested individually. To 
assess affect/mood at time of test, participants completed the Positive and Negative Affective 
Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X, Watson & Clark, 1994) either before or after 
completing the experimental tasks (counterbalanced across participants). The PANAS-X is a 
60-item scale that assesses specific affect types, including negative and positive affect. 
Participants are instructed to rate the extent to which they felt each item during a specified 
time period on a Likert-type scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). For 
this study, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they felt each item “during the 
past few days, including today.” Scores on the Basic Negative and Basic Positive subscales 
were examined to assess participants’ positive and negative affect. There are 23 items that 
assess Basic Negative affect (e.g., afraid, angry, sad) and 18 items that assess Basic Positive 
affect (e.g., happy, proud, attentive). Therefore, the maximum possible scores for Basic 
Negative and Basic Positive affect are (23 items x 5 maximum score per item) 115 and (18 x 
5) 90, respectively. A full consideration of age differences in PANAS-X scores and its 
relation to recall of pictures is presented in the Results section. 
Picture viewing phase. 
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 Participants were seated 65-78 cm from the computer screen. In the ‘passive’ 
instruction condition, they were told to view pictures as they would a television screen, as in 
Charles et al. (2003). In the ‘active’ instruction condition, they were told to categorize each 
picture as positive, negative, or neutral (as in Kensinger et al., 2003) using their dominant 
hand to press keys 1, 2, or 3 (labeled as P, N, U) on the numeric keypad on the keyboard.  
Participants first viewed the series of practice pictures presented one at a time in 
random order at a rate of 4 s per picture. Each picture presentation began with a black 
fixation cross on a white background in the center of the screen for 500 ms, immediately 
followed by the picture. Participants then completed the study phase under the same 
instructions and presentation duration as in practice, and viewed pictures from either list 1 or 
list 2 (counterbalanced). Afterward, participants completed the NART-R, which took 
approximately 5 minutes; this introduced a delay between study and test.  
Memory phase. 
A surprise recall test followed in which participants were asked to write down 
descriptions of as many of the pictures as they could remember from the previously presented 
list, taking as much time as they wished. This was followed by a surprise recognition test for 
the study phase pictures, in which they saw all 48 study phase pictures and the 48 pictures 
from the other picture list which they had not seen before. Lists used for the study phase and 
recognition test were counterbalanced across experimental conditions for each age group.  
For the recognition test, participants were told that they would be viewing a series of 
pictures, some of which they had seen in the study phase (Old pictures), and some of which 
they had not seen in the study phase (New pictures). To indicate that a picture was Old, 
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participants used their dominant hand to press the ‘n’ key on the keyboard (labeled ‘O’ for 
Old), and pressed the ‘m’ key (labeled ‘N’ for New) to indicate that a picture was New. 
Picture presentation specifications for the recognition test were identical to those in the study 
phase, except that picture offset was determined by the participant, or after 30s. 
Picture rating. 
Following the memory tests, participants rated each picture using a modified SAM 
form in a paper-and-pencil booklet, on three different scales ranging from 0-8. They rated (1) 
level of pleasantness (valence), (2) arousal, and (3) the added dimension of personal 
relevance (ranging from completely personally irrelevant to very personally relevant) that 
they felt while viewing each picture. Data from participants’ SAM ratings were used to 
ascertain that participants’ ratings of study pictures were congruent with the normative 
valence and arousal ratings of Lang et al. (2001), and to determine whether any age 
differences in picture ratings existed. Participants first practiced using the rating scales by 
rating pictures from the practice phase. Picture presentation specifications were identical to 
those in the study phase.  Pictures remained on the screen until the 3 ratings were complete, 
or for 15 s. Finally, older adult participants completed the MMSE. 
2.2.2 Results 
Memory for pictures 
 Recall. Two coders independently matched recall responses (written descriptions of 
each picture recalled) to the IAPS pictures from study, and agreed on 96% of picture 
descriptions. Discrepancies in coding were resolved by discussion, and consensus agreement. 
Only one picture description from a younger adult’s recall and six picture descriptions from 
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older adults’ recall could not be coded and so were excluded from the recall totals. Mean 
number of pictures recalled, shown in Table 2, was analyzed in a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with valence (positive, negative, and neutral) as the within-subject factor and age 





Mean number of pictures recalled for each age group as a function of valence type and 
instruction condition in Experiment 1.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  





















































 There was a main effect of age, F(1, 108) = 7.68, p < .01, η2 = .066, with younger 
adults recalling more pictures than older adults. There was also a main effect of valence,  
F(2, 216) = 22.94,  p < .001, η2 =  .18, with better recall of both negative and positive, 
relative to neutral, pictures. Most importantly, there was a significant valence X age 
interaction, F(2, 216) = 3.99, p = .02, η2 = .036. As shown in Figure 2, younger adults 
recalled more negative than both positive (t(55) = 2.35, p < .05) and neutral (t(55) = 7.27, p < 
.001) pictures, and more positive than neutral pictures (t(55) = 3.85, p < .001).  In contrast, 
older adults recalled equal numbers of negative and positive pictures (t(55) = 1.22, p = .23), 
and fewer neutral, compared to both positive (t(55) = 3.60, p < .001) and negative (t(55) = 
2.35, p < .05) pictures.  There was no main effect of instruction (p = .20), and no other 




Figure 2. Mean number of pictures (maximum of 16) of each valence type recalled as a 





























Recognition. Accuracy of recognition performance was computed as false alarm rate 
subtracted from hit rate, for pictures of each valence type. Because there was no main effect 
of instructions (p = .83), and because instructions only interacted with age group (F(1, 108) = 
4.40, p = .38) but did not affect the age x valence interaction (p = .49), results collapsed 
across instruction conditions are reported below. See Table 3 for means. 
Other than the main effect of valence, F(2, 220) = 12.90, p < .0005, no other main 
effects or interactions reached significance (all ps > 0.20). Simple contrasts indicated that 
recognition accuracy was highest for positive (M = 0.84, SD = 0.15) and neutral (M = 0.86, 
SD = 0.16) pictures, which did not differ from each other, F(1, 110) = 1.19, p = .28. 
Recognition accuracy was lower for negative (M = 0.80, SD = 0.14) pictures than for both 
positive (F(1, 110) = 12.71, p = .001) and neutral (F(1, 110) = 24.87, p < .0005) pictures. 





Mean recognition accuracy for each age group as a function of valence type in Experiment 1. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
































 Recall output order. To determine mean output order for pictures of each valence type 
and for each age group, output percentiles were calculated for each participant. Output 
percentiles are “a measure of the… position of a recalled [picture] during output” (Bjork & 
Whitten, 1974, p. 176) relative to the last item recalled. As in Bjork and Whitten (1974), 
output percentiles were calculated as follows: “if a subject recalled a total of N [pictures] 
from a list, the ith [picture] recalled was assigned a percentile score of (i / N) X 100. For 
example, the first of 10 [pictures] recalled was given a score of 10%, and the eighth of 12 
words recalled was given a score of 67%” (p. 177).  Thus, lower output percentiles indicate 
pictures output earlier in recall, and higher output percentiles indicate pictures output later in 
recall (closer to the last item). Output percentiles were analyzed with a repeated measures 
ANOVA, with valence as the within subjects factor and age group as the between subjects 





Mean output percentiles for each age group as a function of valence type in Experiment 1. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
































 There was a main effect of valence, F(2, 214) = 3.03, p = .05. Positive pictures (M = 
54.41, SD = 11.84) were output earlier than neutral pictures (M = 59.00, SD = 13.21) F (1, 
107) = 6.13, p = .015, but output order of negative pictures (M = 55.37, SD = 14.32) did not 
differ from that of neutral pictures (p = .078), and output order of positive pictures did not 
differ from that of negative pictures (p = .63). There was also a main effect of age, F(1, 107) 
= 4.76, p = .031, with older adults recalling study pictures later (M = 57.48, SD = 10.98) than 
younger adults (M = 55.08, SD = 14.88). However, this may be artifactual due to older adults 
recalling fewer pictures compared to younger adults, which results in larger output 
percentiles for older adults. Thus, it is unclear whether true age differences emerged for 
output order of recalled pictures. Crucially, the age x valence interaction was not significant 
(p = .67). Clearly, output order differences do not underlie age differences in recall of 
emotional pictures. 
Affect measure. Because the numbers of items contained in the Basic Negative and 
Positive affect subscales of the PANAS-X are different, raw PANAS-X scores for these 
subscales were converted to percents of the maximum possible score for each subscale to 
directly compare levels of positive and negative affect for each participant. Considered 
separately, each age group reported greater positive (MYounger = 55.29, SDYounger = 15.54; 
MOlder = 62.50, SDOlder = 15.93) than negative (MYounger = 38.42, SDYounger = 14.59; MOlder = 
29.10, SDOlder = 9.49) affect, tYounger(55) = 5.14, p < .001; tOlder(55) = 11.93, p < .001. 
However, comparing age groups, older adults reported greater positive affect, F(1, 110) = 
5.88, p < .05 and less negative affect, F(1, 110) = 16.05, p < .001 than younger adults. Linear 
regression analyses found no relation between negative or positive affect and recall of 
 
32 
pictures of any valence (all ps > .10).  Further analyses verified that a number of other factors 
did not influence the pattern of results. Specifically, FSIQ was not related to recall for any 
valence, and there was no effect of order of PANAS-X administration, or of picture list (1 or 
2), on recall (all ps > .05). Participants recalled more medium-high (M = 9.13, SD = 3.54), 
than medium-low (M = 8.28, SD = 3.33), arousal pictures, F(1, 110) = 9.54, p < .01. Arousal 
and age did not interact.  There was no effect of gender on recall for any valence (p = .58), or 
on affect scores (ps > .39). However, there was an interaction between gender and valence, 
F(2, 220) = 5.65, p = .004: Women recalled a greater number of positive picture (M = 6.52, 
SD = 2.28) than men (M = 5.46, SD = 2.25). 
Participant ratings of pictures 
 Valence.  There was a main effect of valence, F(2, 220) = 579.14, p < .001. 
Consistent with the normative valence ratings (Lang et al., 2001), simple contrasts indicated 
that positive pictures were given higher valence ratings (M = 5.89, SD = 1.20) than neutral 
pictures (M = 3.48, SD = .73), F(1, 110) = 398.26, p < .001 and negative pictures (M = 1.30, 
SD = .90), F(1, 110) = 693.43, p <.001, and negative pictures were given lower ratings than 
neutral pictures F(1, 110) = 492.37, p < .001. Importantly, there was no interaction between 
age group and valence type (p = .54), and no main effect of age group (p = .88). 
Arousal.  For participant ratings of arousal, there was a main effect of valence type, 
F(2, 220) = 14.32, p < .0005. Consistent with the normative ratings, simple contrasts 
indicated that positive (M = 4.05, SD = 1.34) and negative (M = 4.12, SD = 1.47) pictures 
were not rated as significantly different in arousal, F(1, 110) = .092, p = .76. Inconsistent 
with the normative ratings, both negative (F(1, 110) = 30.54, p < .001) and positive (F(1, 
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110) = 28.90, p < .001) pictures were rated as more arousing than neutral (M = 3.44, SD = 
.97) pictures. There was no interaction between age group and valence type (p = .49), and no 
main effect of age group (p = .056). 
Personal relevance.  Mean rated personal relevance of pictures was analyzed with a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with valence (positive, negative, and neutral) and memory 
status (recalled, not recalled) as a within–subject, and age (younger, older) as a between 
subjects manipulation. There was a main effect of valence, F(2, 216) = 85.44, p < .001, with 
positive pictures (M = 4.08, SD = .39) rated as more personally relevant than both negative 
(M = 2.95, SD = .29; F(1, 108) = 65.42,  p < .001) and neutral (M = 2.44, SD = .23; F(1, 108) 
= 183.72, p < .001) pictures, and negative rated as more personally relevant than neutral 
pictures, F(1, 108) = 17.23, p < .001. There was no main effect of recall status on personal 
relevance ratings, and no other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .08). 
 
Personal relevance: High/low split 
 
Having clearly shown that encoding instructions were not critical in whether previous 
studies observed a positivity bias, the second goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether 
personal relevance of pictures affected recall.  A mean split based on average ratings of 
personal relevance for older and for younger adults for positive (MYounger = 4.19, MOlder = 
4.21), negative (MYounger = 2.66, MOlder = 3.18), and neutral (MYounger = 2.24, MOlder = 2.81) 
pictures was used to classify recalled pictures as either high or low in personal relevance. 
These data were then analyzed in the same manner as the recall data. 
For pictures high in personal relevance, there was a main effect of valence F(2, 220) 
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= 9.08, p < .001, η2 = .076; whereas equivalent numbers of negative and positive pictures 
were recalled (p = .39), fewer neutral pictures were recalled compared to both positive, F(1, 
110) = 10.82, p < .001 and negative, F(1, 110) = 16.66, p < .001, pictures. There was no main 




Figure 3. The top panel shows mean recall of pictures rated as high in personal relevance, of 
each valence type in Experiment 1.  The bottom panel shows mean recall of pictures rated as 







































































For pictures low in personal relevance, there was a main effect of age, F(1, 110) = 
5.33, p < .05, η2 = .046, with younger adults recalling more pictures than older adults. 
Importantly, in contrast to the high relevance pictures, there was no main effect of valence, 
but a significant age X valence interaction, F(1, 110) = 4.13, p < .05, η2 = .036. For younger 
adults, there were no differences in recall for the different valence types, but in older adults, a 
positivity bias emerged: Older adults recalled more positive than negative (t(55) = 2.09, p < 
.05) or neutral (t(55) = 2.88, p < .01) pictures; recall of the negative and neutral pictures did 
not differ (see Figure 3b). 
It is possible that unequal numbers of pictures of each valence type were classified as 
low and as high in personal relevance due to the fact that they were based on participants’ 
ratings of pictures, and that this could account for the patterns of the age x valence 
interactions observed. For example, if older participants rated more positive than negative 
pictures as low in personal relevance, this could increase the likelihood that older adults 
would recall a greater number of positive pictures low in personal relevance compared to 
negative pictures low in personal relevance. To address this, the number of pictures recalled 
for each valence type and personal relevance level (low, high) was expressed as a percent of 
the total number of pictures of each valence type classified as low or high in personal 
relevance. These scores thus represent the percent of the total numbers of study pictures for 
each valence and personal relevance level that were recalled by participants. These scores 
were analyzed in the same manner as in the high/low analyses already reported. 
 Concurring with the preceding findings, for pictures high in personal relevance there 
was main effect of valence, F(2, 208) = 4.11, p = .018. More of the positive (M = 41.69, SD 
 
37 
= 24.94; F(1, 104) = 7.14, p = .009) and marginally more of the negative (M = 39.26, SD = 
24.05; F(1, 104) = 3.85, p = .052) pictures were recalled relative to neutral pictures (M = 
32.90, SD = 24.00), but there was no difference in percent of positive and negative pictures 
recalled (p = .41). There was no main effect of age (p = .26), and no age x valence interaction 
(p = .48). 
Again concurring with the preceding findings, for pictures low in personal relevance 
the main effects of age (F(1, 108) = 8.10, p < .01) and valence (F(2, 216) = 7.99, p < .001) 
were qualified by an age x valence interaction F(2, 216) = 3.22, p = .042. Younger adults 
recalled a higher percent of the negative pictures (M = 46.61, SD = 24.25) than of the 
positive pictures (M = 38.45, SD = 19.37), t(54) = 2.09, p = .041, or of the neutral pictures 
(M = 33.44, SD = 20.10), t(54) = 4.23, p < .001, and recalled a higher percent of the positive 
pictures than of the neutral pictures, t(55) = 2.06, p = .045. Older adults recalled a higher 
percent of the positive pictures (M = 35.91, SD = 20.85) than of the neutral pictures (M = 
26.55, SD = 18.68), t(55) = 2.68, p = .01, but percent of positive and of negative (M = 31.80, 
SD = 22.54) pictures recalled did not differ, t(54) = 1.23, p = .22. Percent of negative pictures 
recalled did not differ from percent of neutral pictures recalled, t(54) = 1.41, p = .16. 
2.2.3 Additional Analyses and Discussion of Additional Analyses 
It is possible that the set of pictures chosen in Experiment 1 ended up being mostly 
low in personal relevance for that sample, and that this accounts for the age X valence 
interaction observed in the overall analysis.  To determine whether study pictures were 
indeed perceived as low in personal relevance, the number of study pictures rated as high or 
low in personal relevance for each valence by each participant in Experiment 1, according to 
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the mean split described in the Results section, were analyzed with a repeated measures 
ANOVA with valence (positive, negative, neutral) and personal relevance level (low, high) 
as the within subjects variables, and age group (younger, older) as the between subjects 
variable. Results partially confirmed this idea, as there was a significant main effect of 
personal relevance level, F(1, 110) = 21.49, p < .001, which was qualified by an interaction 
between personal relevance level and valence, F(2, 220) = 5.62, p = .004. There was no 
interaction between age, personal relevance, and valence (p = .12). Paired t-tests showed that 
greater numbers of positive pictures were rated as low in personal relevance (M = 9.49, SD = 
3.93) compared to high in personal relevance (M = 6.51, SD = 3.93), t(111) = 4.01, p < .001. 
The same held true for neutral pictures (low personal relevance: M = 9.86, SD = 3.31; high 
personal relevance: M = 6.14, SD = 3.31; t(111) = 5.94, p < .001). However, the numbers of 
negative pictures rated as high or low in personal relevance were not significantly different (p 
= .10). 
Because many of the pictures were low in personal relevance to participants, this may 
be why Experiment 1 found a positivity bias in older adults’ memory for pictures. By this 
logic, other studies (e.g., Kensinger et al., 2002) may not have found evidence of a positivity 
bias in older adults’ memory because they may have used pictures which were perceived as 
more personally relevant by participants. 
As noted by Charles and Carstensen (2007), "Older adults represent a heterogeneous 
group, and the mean differences…belie the vast differences observed among older adult 
populations" (p. 320). The literature is currently unclear as to how well these differences that 
provide evidence of a positivity bias in older adults' cognitive processing represent older 
 
39 
adults as a whole, given the great inter-individual variability. Evidence for inter-individual 
variability can be found in Experiment 1. When difference scores are created by subtracting 
the number of negative pictures recalled from the number of positive pictures recalled for 
each participant (Figure 4), it can clearly be seen that few older adults actually display the 
mean pattern of recall found in Experiment 1 (recalling equal numbers of positive and 
negative pictures). In fact, most older adult participants recalled greater numbers of positive 
than negative pictures (a ‘positivity bias’), and a substantial number recalled greater numbers 
of negative than positive pictures (a ‘negativity bias’). This pattern is the mirror image of that 
seen in the younger adults: Most younger adult participants displayed a negativity bias, 




Figure 4. Number of participants in each age group in Experiment 1 that recalled more 
positive than negative pictures (Positive), equal numbers of positive and negative pictures 































Consistent with the studies of both Charles et al. (2003) and Mather and Knight 
(2005), there was a significant age X valence interaction in recall of emotional and neutral 
pictures. Specifically, younger adults displayed a negativity bias, in line with a number of 
other studies of various cognitive processes (see Rozin & Royzman, 2001, for a review). 
Younger adults recalled more negative relative to positive and neutral pictures, whereas older 
adults showed a boost in recall for both positive and negative pictures relative to neutral. The 
literature has been unclear whether the positivity bias in older adults’ memory represents an 
increase in memory for positive compared with negative and neutral material (e.g., Charles et 
al., 2003, Experiment 1) or a decrease in memory for negative material (e.g., Charles et al., 
2003, Experiment 2), relative to younger adults. The present results are squarely in line with 
the latter. 
 The present manipulation of instructions—either to passively view or to actively rate 
study pictures—did not influence recall for positive, negative, and neutral pictures in younger 
and older adults. Thus, it appears that differences in instructions between the studies of 
Charles et al. (2003) and Kensinger et al. (2002) do not explain why one study did and the 
other did not find a positivity bias in memory for older adults. 
 With respect to recognition performance, age and valence did not interact, which is in 
line with the findings of Charles et al. (2003). Nevertheless, as recognition accuracy was near 
ceiling (see Table 3 for mean accuracy scores), this may have precluded finding any age 
differences in recognition performance, or an age x valence interaction. For this reason, the 
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recognition results should be viewed with caution. 
 Recall order output analyses did not provide evidence that the positivity bias in older 
adults’ picture recall was due to the order in which items of different valences were recalled, 
thereby discarding another plausible alternative account. 
The second aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the personal relevance of 
study material modulates the positivity bias in older adults’ memory. What is novel here, and 
particularly relevant to the current debate about whether a positivity bias exists in older 
compared to younger adults, is the finding that personal relevance of the pictures did 
determine whether an age X valence interaction was found. When recalled pictures were 
classified as either high or low in personal relevance, an age X valence interaction emerged 
only for pictures rated as low in personal relevance. There were no differences in recall of the 
different valence types for younger adults but the positivity bias emerged in older adults: 
They recalled more positive than both negative and neutral pictures. This is interpreted to 
mean that when to-be-remembered pictures are more personally relevant, older and younger 
adults incidentally encode both positive and negative pictures to a greater extent than neutral 
pictures, resulting in the typically seen boost in recall for emotional, relative to neutral, items 
(e.g., Cahill & McGaugh, 1995). In contrast, when pictures are lower in personal relevance, it 
is possible that older adults may engage in emotion regulation and preferentially encode 
positive, relative to negative and neutral, pictures, which may result in better recall of 
positive pictures.  
Although older adults reported greater positive, and less negative, affect on the 
PANAS-X compared to younger adults, regression analyses indicated that affect was not 
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related to recall for any valence type. Also, both younger and older adults reported more 
positive relative to negative affect when each age group was considered separately, which 
argues against a mood congruency explanation of the age X valence interaction.  Participants 
also rated positive pictures as being most personally relevant, followed by negative and 
neutral pictures. However, participants’ personal relevance ratings for recalled and not 
recalled pictures did not differ, suggesting that personal relevance of the pictures per se does 
not determine which pictures will later be recalled. 
The reasonable conclusion is that differences in personal relevance of picture sets 
used across studies may well account for whether a positivity bias is or is not observed in 
older adults’ memory.  Studies that have found a positivity bias may have used pictures that 
were relatively low in personal relevance to older adult participants, whereas studies that did 
not find a positivity bias may have used pictures that older adults found to be high in 
personal relevance.  The present study suggests that a variable previously not considered—





Experiment 2: Attention and Memory for Emotional Pictures in Aging 
3.1 Introduction 
In the second experiment, attention during presentation (study) of pictures was 
directly manipulated by dividing attention during encoding using another concurrently 
performed task. Dividing attention during encoding typically produces a decrement in later 
memory compared to when encoding is done under conditions of full attention (e.g., 
Anderson, Craik, & Naveh-Benjamin, 1998; Fernandes & Moscovitch, 2000). Previous work 
has demonstrated that only stimuli which are attended to are susceptible to interference 
effects from dividing attention at study. For instance, dividing attention at study has been 
shown to disrupt performance on explicit, but not implicit, tests (e.g. Jacoby, Toth, & 
Yonelinas, 1993; Parkin, Reed, & Russo, 1990). Therefore, it was predicted that dividing 
attention at study should result in greater decrements to memory for the pictures, but only for 
those pictures to which the participant is actively attending.  Pictures to which participants do 
not attend in the first place should not be affected by a division of attention to the same 
extent as pictures which do receive attentional processing.   
If older adults show a positivity bias because they pay more attention to positive 
pictures at encoding, then memory should be worse for positive stimuli when attention is 
divided, compared to memory under full attention.  Also, memory for negative pictures 
should be less affected by dividing attention in older than in younger adults, because older 
adults are hypothesized to avoid attending to negative stimuli (e.g., Mather & Knight, 2005), 
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whereas younger adults often display a negativity bias.  Thus, it is predicted that an 
interaction of Attention X Valence will emerge that is modified by age group (i.e., a 3-way 
interaction).  What is more, this interaction may only emerge for the passive, and not the 
active viewing condition.  That is, if older adults pay less attention to negative stimuli, then 
memory should be relatively unaffected by dividing attention, compared to the effect on 
positive stimuli (to which they are preferentially attending). However, when asked to actively 
rate pictures by valence, older adults would be forced to attend equally to pictures of each 
valence type, hence we should see an effect of attention, but it would not interact with 
valence or age group. 
Mather and Knight (2005) have previously addressed the effects of dividing attention 
during study of emotional pictures, but did not manipulate encoding instructions. In their 
study, older and younger adults passively viewed positive, negative, and neutral IAPS 
pictures and were then given an incidental recall test for the pictures. During encoding of the 
pictures, half of the participants from each age group viewed pictures under full attention, 
and half viewed pictures while completing a distracting task (divided attention). According to 
Mather and Knight, older adults use cognitive control strategies to implement their emotion 
regulation goals. That is, older adults are believed to actively decrease processing of negative 
pictures.  Note that these authors claim that the positivity bias results from a decrease in 
attentional resources devoted to processing of negative information, rather than resulting 
from an increase in attentional resources devoted to the processing of positive pictures. Thus, 
dividing attention during encoding was hypothesized to prevent older adults from being able 
to use cognitive control strategies, and to lead to higher recall of negative pictures in older 
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adults. Results of their study confirmed this hypothesis: Under full attention, older adults’ 
recall consisted of a greater proportion of positive pictures relative to younger adults’ recall, 
whereas under divided attention, older adults’ recall consisted of a greater proportion of 
negative pictures relative to younger adults’ recall. 
The Mather and Knight (2005) study did have limitations. For one, Mather and 
Knight used participants' subjective ratings to divide pictures into positive, negative, and 
neutral "sets" with the sets being roughly equal in number. IAPS ratings were used to break 
ties to determine to which set a given picture would belong, although the percentage of 
pictures for which valence was determined in this manner was not stated. That participants’ 
subjective ratings were used to classify some pictures into valence sets and IAPS ratings 
were used to classify others may reduce the degree to which the purported “subjective 
ratings” are valid subjective ratings of participants. Another limitation is that Mather and 
Knight did not report proportions of positive relative to negative pictures recalled within each 
age group, but claimed that older adults “remember[ed] more positive than negative pictures” 
(p. 564) when pictures were encoded under full attention. By not demonstrating greater recall 
of positive relative to negative pictures, it is unclear whether their ‘positivity bias’ is the 
result of recalling more positive or less negative information, relative to younger adults.  
To recapitulate, the goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether dividing attention 
at encoding would affect whether older adults display a positivity bias in memory for the 
pictures presented at study, and whether this effect would depend upon encoding instructions 
given to participants. Thus, the variables that were manipulated included: attention (full, 
divided) and encoding instructions (passive, active). As mentioned in Experiment 1, an Age x 
 
47 
Valence interaction is expected to emerge only for recall and not for recognition 
performance, in the full attention condition. In terms of personal relevance, it is predicted 
that the positivity bias in older adults' recall will emerge only for pictures low in personal 
relevance, in the full attention condition thereby also providing a replication of Experiment 1. 
However, it is expected that dividing attention at encoding will disrupt this pattern of results 
such that the positivity bias will not emerge for older adults for pictures low personal 
relevance. Dividing attention at encoding should prevent older adults from preferentially 
encoding positive pictures. 
3.2 Method and Results 
3.2.1 Method 
Participants.  Sixty-four people took part in this study: Thirty-two healthy 
community-dwelling older adults (61 – 93 years of age; 24 female) were recruited through 
the University of Waterloo’s Research in Aging Participant pool, and 32 younger adults (18 – 
25 years of age; 21 female) were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes (see Table 
5 for participant characteristics). For participating, older adults received $10 remuneration 
and younger adults received course credit. For both age groups, inclusion criteria were: 
fluency in English, normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing, no current or history of 
neuropsychological impairment, and no head injury resulting in unconsciousness for more 
than 1 minute.  For older adults, an additional exclusion criterion was a score of less than 26 
on the MMSE. Older adults had a higher full scale IQ (FSIQ), F(1, 62) = 21.75, p < .01, as 
estimated by the NART-R, but did not differ from young with respect to years of education 















































































 Apparatus. The same computer, monitor, and software were used as in Experiment 1. 
 Stimuli. The same 96 pictures and six practice pictures from Experiment 1 were used. 
The distracter task used for divided attention conditions was a digit monitoring task. For this 
task, two 117-item lists of randomly generated odd and even two digit numbers were created. 
Twenty sets of three odd numbers in a row occurred in the first list (odd digit list), and 20 
sets of three even numbers in a row occurred in the second list (even digit list), with 
placement of the sets of odd or even numbers in a row within each list being identical 
between the two lists. Two additional 20-item lists of randomly generated odd and even 
numbers were created for practice purposes. In these practice lists, three sets of three odd or 
even numbers in a row occurred, with placement of sets of three numbers being identical 
between the two practice lists. 
 Procedure. Procedures were virtually identical to those in Experiment 1, except for 
the addition of the divided attention (DA) conditions. Thus, Experiment 2 had four 
experimental conditions. Two were the full attention conditions from Experiment 1 (passive 
instructions, active instructions), and two were the corresponding DA conditions (passive 
instructions, DA; and active instructions, DA). In each condition, half of the participants in 
each age group completed digit monitoring with the odd digit lists; the other half received the 
even digit lists. Participants first practiced either viewing or categorizing the practice 
pictures, or practicing the digit monitoring task (counterbalanced for order). Afterwards, they 
practiced either viewing or categorizing the pictures while carrying out the digit monitoring 
task. During the study phase of the DA conditions, participants viewed or categorized 
pictures while completing the digit monitoring task. For the digit monitoring task, number 
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lists were presented auditorily at a rate of one number every two seconds. Participants were 
told that they would hear a tape recorded voice reading a list of odd and even two digit 
numbers, and were asked to say yes out loud to indicate when they heard three (odd or even, 
depending on the list) numbers in a row. In the study phase of the DA conditions, participants 
were asked to divide their efforts equally between viewing/categorizing pictures and carrying 
out digit monitoring. 
3.2.2 Results 
Memory for pictures 
 Recall. Two coders independently matched recall responses to the IAPS pictures from 
study and agreed on 96% of picture descriptions, resolving coding discrepancies by 
discussion, and consensus agreement. Only one picture description from a younger adult’s 
recall and four picture descriptions from older adults’ recall could not be coded and so were 
excluded from the recall totals. Mean number of pictures recalled, shown in Table 6, was 
analyzed in a repeated-measures ANOVA with valence (positive, negative, and neutral) as 
the within-subject factor and age (younger, older), instruction (passive, active), and attention 





Mean number of pictures recalled for each age group in Experiment 2 as a function of 
valence type and instruction condition.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
   
















































































































































There was a main effect of age, F(1, 56) = 5.80, p = .02, η2 = .094, with younger 
adults (M = 12.91, SD = 5.61) recalling more pictures than older adults (M = 10.19, SD = 
4.63). There was also a main effect of valence, F(2, 112) = 8.82, p < .001, η2 = .14, with 
better recall of both negative and positive (p = .87) pictures, relative to neutral pictures (ps < 
.01). There was a main effect of instruction F(1, 56) = 5.80, p = .019, η2 = .094, with 
participants recalling a greater number of pictures in the active condition (M = 12.91, SD = 
4.55) than in the passive condition (M = 10.19, SD = 5.68). There was also a main effect of 
attention condition F(1,  56) = 13.16, p = .001, η2 = .19, with participants recalling a greater 
number of pictures in the full attention condition (M = 13.59, SD = 5.18) than in the DA 
condition (M = 9.50, SD = 4.61). No interactions reached significance (all ps > .09), 
including the age x valence interaction (p = .50). Because there were no interactions with 
instruction condition, this factor was excluded from further analyses. 
Recognition. Accuracy of recognition performance was computed the same way as in 
Experiment 1. Because there was no main effect of instructions (p = .37), and because no 
interactions with instructions reached significance (all ps > .05), results without instruction 
condition are reported. 
There was a main effect of attention, F(1, 60) = 9.59, p = .003. Participants were 
more accurate in the full attention condition (M = 0.79, SD = .34) than in the DA condition 
(M = 0.58, SD = .21). No other main effects or interactions reached significance (all ps > 





Mean recognition accuracy for each age group in Experiment 2 as a function of valence type 
and attention condition. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
  
















































































 Digit monitoring accuracy. Accuracy for the distracter task was calculated as hit rate 
– false alarm rate, and was analyzed with a univariate ANOVA with age (younger, older) and 
instruction condition (active, passive) as between subjects variables. Younger adults (M = 
0.91, SD = .12) were more accurate than older adults (M = .72, SD = 0.30), F(1, 28) = 20.93, 
p < .001. There was a main effect of instruction condition, F(1, 28) = 73.10, p < .001, which 
was qualified by a significant interaction between age group and instruction condition, F(1, 
28) = 23.99, p < .001. However, bivariate correlations showed no relation between digit 
monitoring accuracy and number of pictures recalled of any valence, for any age group or 
instruction condition (all ps > .07). 
Affect measure. Raw PANAS-X scores were converted to percents as in Experiment 
1. Considered separately, each age group reported greater positive (MYounger = 55.18, 
SDYounger = 12.24; MOlder = 64.41, SDOlder = 13.82) than negative (MYounger = 34.47, SDYounger 
= 11.71; MOlder = 28.71, SDOlder = 8.74) affect, tYounger(31) = 8.52, p < .001; tOlder(31) = 13.05, 
p < .001. However, comparing age groups, older adults reported greater positive affect, F(1, 
62) = 7.98, p = .006 and less negative affect, F(1, 62) = 4.96, p = .029 than younger adults. 
Bivariate correlations found no relation between negative or positive affect and recall of 
pictures of any valence for any age group and any attention condition (all ps > .05), except 
that for older adults in the full attention condition, greater positive affect was related to 
increased recall of neutral pictures, r = 0.63, p = .009.  
Further analyses verified that a number of other factors did not influence the pattern 
of results. Specifically, FSIQ was not related to recall for any valence, for any age group or 
attention condition (ps > .05), except that for younger adults in the full attention condition, 
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greater recall of negative pictures was related to lower FSIQ, r = -0.61, p = .012, and for 
older adults in the DA condition, greater recall of positive pictures was related to higher 
FSIQ, r = 0.51, p = .041. There was no effect of order of PANAS-X administration, or of 
picture list (1 or 2), on recall (all ps > .09). Unlike in Experiment 1, there was no difference 
in recall between pictures of medium-high and medium-low arousal (p = .45), nor did arousal 
level interact with any other variables (all ps > .20).  There was no effect of gender on recall 
for any valence (ps > .1), or on affect scores (ps > .05). 
Participant ratings of pictures 
 Valence.  There was a main effect of valence, F(2, 124) = 401.45, p < .001. 
Consistent with the normative valence ratings (Lang et al., 2001), simple contrasts indicated 
that positive pictures were given higher valence ratings (M = 5.99, SD = 1.01) than neutral 
pictures (M = 3.55, SD = .79), F(1, 62) = 214.11, p < .001 or negative pictures (M = 1.30, SD 
= .85), F(1, 62) = 520.21, p <.001, and that negative pictures were given lower ratings than 
neutral pictures, F(1, 62) = 417.35, p < .001. There was no interaction between age group and 
valence type, p = .83, and no main effect of age group, p = .91. 
Arousal.  For participant ratings of arousal, there was a main effect of valence type, 
F(2, 124) = 13.69, p < .001. Consistent with the normative ratings, simple contrasts indicated 
that positive (M = 4.26, SD = 1.42) and negative (M = 3.95, SD = 1.28) pictures were not 
rated as significantly different in arousal, F(1, 62) = .2.68,  p = .11. Inconsistent with the 
normative ratings, both negative (F(1, 62) = 15.33, p < .001) and positive (F(1, 62) = 31.16, p 
< .001) pictures were rated as more arousing than neutral (M = 3.46, SD = 1.21) pictures. 
There was no interaction between age group and valence type (p = .80), and no main effect of 
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age group (p = .061). 
Personal relevance.  Mean rated personal relevance of pictures was analyzed with a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, with valence (positive, negative, and neutral) and memory 
status (recalled, not recalled) as within–subjects variables, and age (younger, older) and 
attention condition (full, divided) as between subjects variables. There was a main effect of 
valence, F(2, 100) = 36.14, p < .001, with positive pictures (M = 3.82, SD = 1.55) rated as 
more personally relevant than both negative (M = 2.77, SD = 1.28; F(1, 50) = 41.92,  p < 
.001) and neutral (M = 2.56, SD = 1.27; F(1, 50) = 64.33, p < .001) pictures, which did not 
differ from each other F(1, 50) = 1.68, p = .20. There was a main effect of attention F(1, 50) 
= 10.27, p = .002. Rated personal relevance was higher for participants in the full attention 
condition (M = 3.57, SD = 1.19) compared to participants in the DA condition (M = 2.53, SD 
= 1.19). There was also an interaction between valence and memory status, F(2, 100) = 3.61, 
p = .031. For neutral pictures only, rated personal relevance of recalled pictures (M = 2.91, 
SD = 1.70) was higher than that of pictures not recalled (M = 2.31, SD = 1.21), t(54) = 2.91, 
p = .005. There was an interaction between valence and attention, F(2, 100) = 4.38, p = .015, 
but no other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps > .1). 
 
Personal relevance: High/low split 
 
A mean split based on average ratings of personal relevance for older and for younger 
adults for positive (MYounger = 3.76, MOlder = 3.72), negative (MYounger = 2.73, MOlder = 2.66), 
and neutral (MYounger = 2.89, MOlder = 2.94) pictures was used to classify recalled pictures as 
either high or low in personal relevance. These data were then analyzed in the same manner 
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as in Experiment 1. 
For pictures high in personal relevance viewed under full attention, there was a main 
effect of valence, F(2, 60) = 19.23, p < .001, η2 = .39. A greater number of positive pictures 
(M = 3.78, SD = 2.48) was recalled relative to both negative (M = 2.69, SD = 1.99; F(1, 30) 
= 10.57, p = .003) and neutral (M = 1.94, SD = 1.68; F(1, 30) = 34.38, p < .001) pictures, and 
a greater number of negative pictures was recalled relative to neutral pictures, F(1, 30) = 
10.02, p = .004. There was no main effect of age (p = 0.10), and no significant age X valence 
interaction (p = .27). For pictures high in personal relevance viewed under DA, there was no 
main effect of valence (p = .061) or age (p = .48), and no age x valence interaction (p = .83). 
For pictures low in personal relevance viewed under full attention, there was no main 
effect of valence (p = .11) or age (p =.68), and no interaction of age x valence (p = .35). For 
pictures low in personal relevance viewed under DA, there was a marginal effect of valence, 
F(2, 60) = 3.09, p = .053, η2 = .093. A greater number of negative pictures (M = 2.06, SD = 
1.34) was recalled relative to neutral pictures (M = 1.38, SD =1.68), F(1, 30) = 4.29, p = 
.047, but recall of negative pictures did not differ from recall of positive pictures (M = 1.63, 
SD = 1.18), F(1, 30) = 2.73, p = .11, and recall of positive pictures did not differ from recall 
of neutral pictures, F(1, 30) = 1.14, p = .30. There was no main effect of age (p = .29), and no 
age x valence interaction (p = .54). 
Additional Analyses 
It is possible that the sample size (64 participants) did not provide adequate power to 
detect a significant age x valence x attention interaction for picture recall.  To address this, 
additional analyses were conducted to show how the pattern of the age x valence interaction 
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found in Experiment 1 becomes stronger when data from the 32 participants from the full 
attention condition in Experiment 2 are added to the Experiment 1 analyses. Experiment 1 
consisted of 112 participants, and the valence X age interaction was significant with an effect 
size (η2) of .036. Adding the 32 participants from the full attention condition in Experiment 2 
(who completed the same tasks as participants in Experiment 1, but also practiced digit 
monitoring and practiced a DA condition), the effect size for the age x valence interaction 
increases to .038. Inferring from this, it is possible that an increase in sample size in 
Experiment 2 would have produced a significant age x valence interaction in the full 
attention condition, and perhaps a significant age x valence x attention interaction.  
Examining the age x valence interaction separately in the full and DA conditions, the 
age x valence interaction in the full attention condition had an effect size of .051, whereas in 
the DA condition, the age x valence interaction had an effect size of .002 . Thus, it is possible 
that with more power, the pattern of results would show a significant age x valence 
interaction under full attention, replicating results from Experiment 1. A non-significant age 
x valence interaction under conditions of DA would show the disruptive effects of dividing 
attention at encoding on the positivity bias in older adults’ recall. In addition, it is possible 
that an insufficiently large N contributed to the null findings in the low personal relevance 
data in the full attention condition of Experiment 2. 
3.3 Discussion 
The failure of Experiment 2 to replicate the age x valence interaction found in 
Experiment 1 is curious. Participants in the full attention condition completed the same tasks 
(with the exception of practicing the digit monitoring task and practicing dual-tasking) as 
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participants in Experiment 1. It is possible that the lower power of Experiment 2 (which 
contained only 64 participants compared to the 112 participants in the first experiment) 
contributed to this null finding, as well as the failure to replicate the positivity bias in older 
adults’ recall of pictures low in personal relevance. 
It is interesting to note that Mather and Knight (2005) observed a positivity bias in 
older adults’ recall of emotional pictures with the same number of participants as in 
Experiment 2. Thus, it is possible that a factor other than low power contributed to the null 
findings. For instance, the manipulation of encoding instructions may have created “noise” in 
the data which precluded finding a significant age x valence interaction, or an age x valence 
interaction in the pictures low in personal relevance. Because Mather and Knight have found 
evidence that dividing attention disrupts the positivity bias in older adults’ memory for 
emotional pictures, and because the data from Experiment 2 may have been particularly 
“noisy” due to the manipulation of encoding instructions, the present conflicting results 
should not be taken as strong evidence that attention at encoding does not play a role in 







Summary of Studies and General Discussion 
This thesis sought to determine factors which influence the positivity bias in older 
adults' memory, using realistic pictorial stimuli. In the first experiment, older and younger 
adults viewed a series of positive, negative, and neutral pictures. Encoding instructions were 
manipulated such that participants either passively viewed the pictures, or actively 
categorized the pictures by valence. Results from an incidental free recall test indicated that 
younger adults displayed a negativity bias in recall whereas older adults recalled equal 
numbers of positive and negative pictures, although they recalled fewer pictures overall 
compared to younger adults. These results are consistent with the idea that the 'positivity bias' 
in older adults' memory is the result of a decrease in memory for negative information, rather 
than an increase in memory for positive information. 
Encoding instructions had no effect on the positivity bias, indicating that this factor 
did not contribute to the cross-study differences in observing a positivity bias. Instead, 
another factor, personal relevance of study pictures, was shown to moderate the positivity 
bias in older adults' memory. Specifically, the positivity bias emerged for pictures that 
participants rated as low in personal relevance, but not for pictures high in personal 
relevance, indicating that personal relevance of study materials may underlie the cross-study 
differences in the literature regarding the positivity bias in memory. The findings of this 
thesis suggest that the positivity bias in older adults’ memory occurs when information being 
remembered is not particularly personally relevant; when information is not self-relevant, 
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older adults may engage in emotion regulation to decrease the impact of on their memory of 
non-relevant negative information. In contrast, when material is self-relevant, older adults 
may eschew their emotion regulation goals to process all information that is self-relevant, 
regardless of its valence. Put simply, older adults can focus on the negative if they have to (as 
in the case for material that is high in personal relevance), but will avoid committing negative 
material to memory if it is not personally relevant (likely in the effort of maintaining positive 
affect).  As a test of this idea, it would be interesting to see whether older adults display a 
positivity bias for information that would be crucial to their well-being, such as when making 
health decisions. Although some evidence suggests that older adults do display a bias in 
attention and memory for positive information when making health care decisions in 
computer-based scenarios (Löckenhoff & Carstensen, 2007), it is unclear how well these 
laboratory situations generalize to real-life health care decision making processes. These 
findings also suggest that future studies should routinely gather data on the personal 
relevance of study materials and include this variable in their analyses or stratify analyses 
based on personal relevance levels. 
There was no evidence of a positivity bias in older adults' recognition performance, 
and recall output order could not account for this bias, as there was no evidence to suggest 
that older adults recalled positive pictures earlier in recall, or that older adults recalled 
negative pictures later in recall, relative to younger adults. Thus, output interference does not 
seem to play a role in whether a positivity bias is observed in older adults’ memory.  
In the second experiment, attention to study pictures was directly manipulated 
through use of a divided attention paradigm. From the results of Experiment 2, it is unclear 
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whether attention to pictures influences the positivity bias in older adults' recall, and this may 
have been due to the smaller sample size used (64 participants), compared to the sample size 
of Experiment 1 (112 participants). However, as discussed in Experiment 2, the effect size of 
the age x valence interaction was much larger in the full attention condition compared to the 
DA condition. The idea that dividing attention at encoding may disrupt the positivity bias in 
older adults’ memory agrees with Mather and Knight (2005), in which a positivity bias in 
older adults’ recall for pictures emerged when these were encoded during full attention, but 
was disrupted when pictures were encoded under DA. Mather and Knight suggest that older 
adults may use cognitive control (attentional) strategies to regulate their emotions but when 
they are distracted and face increased cognitive load, they are unable to use these strategies to 
implement emotion regulation goals. 
 Moreover, from the discussion of studies in the general introduction, it is clear that 
the positivity bias in memory is far from robust. As such, it seems possible that a number of 
factors may contribute to whether a positivity bias in older adults’ memory is observed. 
Results from this thesis demonstrate that factors such as the personal relevance of the study 
material influence whether older adults display a positivity bias in memory for emotional 
stimuli.   
A further avenue to explore the role of personal relevance in memory would be to 
determine whether memory performance would benefit more from processing emotional 
material in a personally relevant manner in older adults than in younger adults. In an 
experiment that would test this hypothesis, both older and younger adults would view a series 
of positive, negative, and neutral pictures matched on the dimensions of valence and arousal 
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and be asked to process the pictures in three ways: (1) in a personally relevant manner (e.g., 
imagining how they would feel if they were in the situation portrayed in each of the pictures), 
(2) in an emotional manner (e.g., deciding whether each picture is positive, negative, or 
neutral), or (3) for perceptual content (e.g., counting the number of different colours in each 
picture). Participants would then complete a surprise recall test for the pictures. If the older 
adults recalled a greater proportion of pictures processed in a personally relevant manner 
compared to the younger adults, this would support the idea that older adults’ memory 
performance can be especially enhanced by processing information in a personally relevant 
manner. Moreover, the study could determine whether processing material in a personally 
relevant manner affects memory for positive, negative, or neutral materials to a different 
extent, and whether aging modulates these effects. 
As Mather and Knight (2005) have shown that attention to stimuli can affect the 
positivity bias in older adults’ memory, another avenue of investigation would be to provide 
converging evidence that older adults pay more attention to positive (or less attention to 
negative) stimuli compared to younger adults. This hypothesis could by tested using the 
attentional blink (AB) paradigm (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Shapiro, Caldwell, 
Sorensen, 1997), which involves rapid serial visual presentations after which participants 
report whether a visual target had been presented. Studies have found that participants are 
unable to detect the presentation of a second target if it is presented less than 500 msec after a 
first (i.e., a blink in attention occurs). Importantly, it has been shown that the AB is shorter 
when the second target is an emotional word (e.g., Ogawa & Suzuki, 2004), indicating that 
emotional words capture attention. The magnitude of the AB of older and younger adults for 
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positive, negative, and neutral words and pictures could be compared to determine whether 
positive stimuli capture the attention of older adults to a greater extent than negative or 
neutral stimuli, relative to younger adults. Specifically the AB of older adults should be 
shortest for positive stimuli, relative to negative and neutral stimuli, whereas the AB of 
younger adults should be shortest for negative stimuli. This would provide support for the 
idea that attention to positive stimuli plays a role in the positivity bias.  
Although tangential to the data of Experiments 1 and 2, it is intriguing to consider 
how the positivity bias in older adults’ memory for emotional stimuli could be related to 
neuropsychological functioning. According to Ochsner and Gross (2005), many 
neuroimaging studies provide evidence that the prefrontal cortex plays an important role in 
the cognitive control of emotions (emotion regulation). If older adults use cognitive control 
strategies dependent upon frontal lobe functioning to implement their emotion regulation 
goals, it is possible that medical conditions which adversely affect frontal lobe functioning, 
such as cardiovascular disease and frontal lobe dementias (e.g., Raz, Rodrigue, Kennedy, & 
Acker, 2007), would render older adults less able to use these strategies, decreasing the 
likelihood that they would show a positivity bias in memory or attention.  
In addition, a number of studies have shown that older adults who perform memory 
tasks as well as younger adults display bilateral activation in the brain, whereas low 
performing older adults display unilateral activity (e.g., see Cabeza, 2002). Relative to 
unilateral activation, bilateral activation is seen as evidence of greater recruitment of neural 
resources to perform a task. As such, it is possible that older adults who display bilateral 
activation patterns when performing memory tasks may be more able to implement emotion 
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regulation goals (Mather & Knight, 2005) and so be more likely to demonstrate a positivity 
bias in memory. 
It seems likely that other factors may play a role in determining whether any given 
older adult would display a positivity bias in attention or memory. In this vein, it has been 
shown that although adults generally experience a decrease in negative affect over the life 
span, individual differences in personality traits are related to differences in the decline of 
negative affect experienced over time. For example, Charles, Reynolds, and Gatz (2001) 
found that individuals who scored higher on the neuroticism personality trait experienced an 
attenuated decrease of negative affect over the life span. In addition, Kunzmann, Little, and 
Smith (2000) demonstrated that declines in functional abilities and presence of chronic 
illnesses contributed to increases in negative affect among the oldest old. Therefore, future 
work should focus on identifying factors that moderate or mediate the positivity bias in older 
adults' cognitive processing, and should integrate these findings into studies by controlling 
for these variables, to provide a more complete account of this phenomenon, and to better 
characterize late life cognitive processing of emotional material. 
Although Experiment 2 was unable to demonstrate a role of attention at encoding in 
the positivity bias in older adults’ memory for emotional stimuli (possibly due to low power 
and “noisy” data from the encoding instruction manipulation), the finding in Experiment 1 
that the positivity bias in older adults’ memory is moderated by the personal relevance of 
study materials is intriguing. The onus on future studies will be to make a point of collecting 
data about the personal relevance of stimuli to participants to further elucidate the role of 
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Characteristics of IAPS pictures used in study. Mean IAPS-normed ratings for valence and arousal 






























Positive – no people, medium-low arousal 
 
 
Nature 5201 7.06 (1.71) 3.83 (2.49) Nature 5220 7.01 (1.50) 3.91 (2.27) 
 
Sky 5593 6.47 (1.57) 3.98 (2.31) Sky 5991 6.55 (2.09) 4.01 (2.44) 
 
Dog 1510 7.01 (2.07) 4.28 (2.47) Dog 1500 7.24 (1.88) 4.12 (2.50) 
 
IceCream 7340 6.68 (1.63) 3.69 (2.58) Pancakes 7286 6.36 (1.72) 4.44 (2.44) 
 
Positive – no people – medium-high arousal 
 
 
Gold 8500 6.96 (1.64) 5.60 (2.40) Money 8502 7.51 (1.72) 5.78 (2.49) 
 
Fireworks 5910 7.80 (1.23) 5.59 (2.55) Fireworks 5480 7.53 (1.63) 5.48 (2.35) 
 
Mountains 5600 7.57 (1.48) 5.19 (2.70) Mountains 5700 7.61 (1.46) 5.68 (2.33) 
 
Jaguar 1650 6.65 (2.25) 6.23 (1.99) Jaguars 1722 7.04 (2.02) 5.22 (2.49) 
 
Positive – people – medium-low arousal 
 
 
Mother 2540 7.63 (1.51) 3.97 (2.33) Mother 2310 7.06 (1.52) 4.16 (2.01) 
 
Family 2395 7.49 (1.69) 4.19 (2.40) Family 2299 7.27 (1.53) 3.95 (2.22) 
 
Father 2165 7.63 (1.48) 4.55 (2.55) Father 2057 7.81 (1.28) 4.54 (2.41) 
 
Couple 4700 6.91 (1.94) 4.05 (1.90) Couple 2530 7.80 (1.55) 3.99 (2.11) 
 





Skier 8021 6.79 (1.44) 5.67 (2.37) Skier 8193 6.73 (1.58) 6.04 (2.19) 
 
HangGlider 8161 6.71 (1.64) 6.09 (2.24) HangGlider  5626 6.71 (2.06) 6.10 (2.19) 
 


















Negative – no people – medium-low arousal 
 
 
Cemetery 9001 3.10 (2.02) 3.67 (2.30) Cemetery 9000 2.55 (1.55) 4.06 (2.25) 
 
BurntBldg 9471 3.16 (1.35) 4.48 (2.02) Ruins 9470 3.05 (1.51) 5.05 (1.98) 
 
Cigarettes 9830 2.54 (1.75) 4.86 (2.63) Garbage 9290 2.88 (1.52) 4.40 (2.11) 
 
Smoke 9280 2.8 (1.54) 4.26 (2.44) Rat 1280 3.66 (1.75) 4.93 (2.01) 
 
 
Negative – no people – medium-high arousal 
 
 
Ship 9621 3.22 (1.76) 5.76 (2.05) Shipwreck 9620 2.70 (1.64) 6.11 (2.10) 
 
Jet 9622 3.10 (1.9) 6.26 (1.98) Bomb 9630 2.96 (1.72) 6.06 (2.22) 
 
RoachOn 
Pizza 7380 2.46 (1.42) 5.88 (2.44) Roaches 1274 3.17 (1.53) 5.39 (2.39) 
 
FliesOnPie 7360 3.59 (1.95) 5.11 (2.25) PieW/bug 7359 2.92 (1.70) 5.36 (2.19) 
 




Man 9331 2.87 (1.28) 3.85 (2.00) Bum 2750 2.56 (1.32) 4.31 (1.81) 
 
Pollution 9342 2.85 (1.41) 4.49 (1.88) Pollution 9341 3.38 (1.89) 4.50 (2.1) 
 
SadGirls 2455 2.96 (1.79) 4.46 (2.12) Girl 2276 2.67 (1.66) 4.63 (1.93) 
 
Man 2490 3.32 (1.82) 3.95 (2.00) ElderlyWoman 2590 3.26 (1.92) 3.93 (1.94) 
 





Attack 6530 2.76 (1.86) 6.18 (2.02) Attack 6360 2.23 (1.73) 6.33 (2.51) 
 
AimedGun 6244 3.09 (1.78) 5.68 (2.51) AimedGun 6243 2.33 (1.49) 5.99 (2.23) 
 
Car 
Accident 9920 2.50 (1.52) 5.76 (1.96) CarAccident 9910 2.06 (1.26) 6.20 (2.16) 
 
DyingMan 3230 2.02 (1.30) 5.41 (2.21) Hospital 3220 2.49 (1.29) 5.52 (1.86) 
 
Neutral – no people – medium-low arousal 
 
 
Mushroom 5531 5.15 (1.45) 3.69 (2.11) Mushrooms 5532 5.19 (1.69) 3.79 (2.20) 
 
Traffic 7595 4.55 (1.46) 3.77 (2.22) Traffic 7590 4.75 (1.55) 3.80 (2.13) 
 
CarCrash 7920 4.51 (1.40) 3.87 (2.15) Car 7096 5.54 (1.26) 3.98 (1.87) 
 
Agate 7820 5.39 (1.41) 4.21 (2.05) Agate 7830 5.26 (1.38) 4.08 (2.11) 
 
Neutral – no people – medium-high arousal 
 
 
Volcano 5920 5.16 (1.92) 6.23 (2.08) Lava 5940 4.23 (1.68) 6.29 (1.85) 
 
Bomber 6910 5.31 (2.28) 5.62 (2.46) Aircraft 6900 4.76 (2.06) 5.64 (2.22) 
 
Turtle 1945 4.59 (1.68) 4.42 (2.03) Lizard 1121 5.79 (1.61) 4.83 (1.98) 
 
Leopard 1310 4.60 (1.62) 6.00 (1.80) Tiger 1726 4.79 (2.10) 6.23 (2.19) 
 
Neutral – people – medium-low arousal 
 
 
Musician 2487 5.20 (1.80) 4.05 (1.92) Man 2485 5.69 (1.36) 3.74 (1.84) 
 
Runner 8465 5.96 (1.49) 3.93 (2.34) Runner 8010 4.38 (1.86) 4.12 (2.08) 
 
Smoking 2749 5.04 (1.39) 3.76 (2.03) Beer 2600 5.84 (1.85) 4.16 (1.74) 
 
Office 7550 5.27 (1.40) 3.95 (1.91) Couple 4605 5.59 (1.52) 3.84 (2.12) 
 
Neutral – people – medium-high arousal 
 
 





Boxer 8232 5.07 (1.80) 5.10 (2.21) Boxer 8060 5.36 (2.23) 5.31 (1.99) 
 
Volcano 
Skier 8192 5.52 (1.53) 6.03 (1.97) IceClimber 8191 6.07 (1.73) 6.19 (2.17) 
 
Jet 7620 5.78 (1.72) 4.92 (2.11) Boy 9411 4.63 (1.58) 5.37 (1.97) 
 
 
